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Prospects for a Universal Basic Income  
in New Zealand 
Keith RanKin 
Unitec Institute of Technology  
Auckland, New Zealand 
New Zealand is a small liberal capitalist country with a history of 
egalitarian values and political reform—including the early intro-
duction of universal welfare benefits—and with an uncomplicated 
relatively flat income tax structure. As such, it has sometimes been 
seen as a "social laboratory," a theme of writing about New Zealand 
and of New Zealand social historians. It therefore has all of the ele-
ments in place that could make New Zealand a candidate to become 
a world leader in integrating income tax and social welfare regimes 
into a form of universal basic income. Nevertheless, through a com-
bination of intellectual inertia, media cynicism, and the requisite 
elements not all coming together at the same time, the outlook for an 
open and healthy discussion around public property rights and un-
conditional benefits remains constrained. Despite this unpromis-
ing intellectual environment, New Zealand may yet stumble upon 
such reform as a political compromise, as it might have done in 1988.
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Essentially, any fixed publicly-sourced payment payable 
as a right to all adult residents of a country may be called a 
universal basic income (UBI). For present purposes at least, a 
UBI does not have to, on its own, meet any minimum adequa-
cy condition. Rather, it can be understood simply as a social 
dividend—a return on the contribution of public inputs to eco-
nomic output—in the context of a liberal capitalist society that 
flourishes when there is a healthy balance between its private 
and public domains (Rankin, 1997). 
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Conceptually, a UBI represents a straightforward appli-
cation of the principles of horizontal equity (treating equal 
"citizens" equally) and public equity (the public as an equity 
partner of economic activity). The principle of horizontal 
equity should be understood as complementary rather than 
antagonistic to the alternate principle of vertical equity (treat-
ing unequals unequally, for example, on the basis of unmet 
basic needs).
At its core, any nation's public finances can be visualized 
according to these equity principles: for example, considering 
a top rate of income tax (not necessarily the very top rate) as 
a proportional (flat) tax on all income, and accumulating the 
lower-rate discounts into a tax credit—an implicit benefit—to 
each person with market income. We may call this revealed 
credit a "public equity benefit," and interpret it as an entitle-
ment arising from each person's stake in those many public 
resources that contribute to national income. Such a credit 
should be understood therefore as a return on capital (Rankin, 
2016a)—not a wage, and not a transfer.
A public equity benefit that is the same for all adult tax-
residents—a ddividend or demogrant—may be given a name 
such as a Universal Basic Income (Rankin, 1991) or a Public 
Equity Dividend (Rankin, 2016c). In 1991 (Rankin, p. 5) I de-
scribed it thus: "a universal tax credit available to every adult—
the universal basic income (UBI)—and a moderately high flat 
tax rate." This gives a "basic income flat tax" couplet, the core 
parameters (benefit and cost) of a universal apparatus of basic 
income.  
Such a core unconditional income would usually be supple-
mented by provision for peripheral social assistance. So long as 
supplementary transfers are available to those with particular 
needs (such as single-parent families) or those without access 
to market-sourced income, a public equity dividend need not, 
of itself, be required to meet their needs. The central principles 
of an equity dividend are those of universality and uncondi-
tionality, not of adequacy.  
In a high productivity country with a very high public re-
source base, a universal equity dividend might be sufficiently 
high that no social assistance transfers are required. Although 
this special case should be understood as the exception and 
not the rule, a UBI apparatus comes into its own as a system 
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of liberté and égalité when the basic income dividend is suf-
ficiently high that few, if any, people require supplementary 
assistance.
 Alternate Accounting Procedure as  
the First Step to Reform 
To economists, publicly-sourced cash benefits are all called 
"transfers," and are macroeconomically equivalent to negative 
taxes. Indeed, any tax concession or exemption can be reinter-
preted as a credit: a benefit, a transfer, or a subsidy. Consider 
the simple example of a 30 percent income tax subject to a 
$13,000 annual income exemption; that is, the first $13,000 of 
market income is taxed at zero percent (a discount of 30 cents 
in the dollar). For all persons earning $13,000 (or more), this 
discount is equivalent to an unconditional tax rebate (or credit) 
of $3,900 (thirty percent of $13,000), which is $75 per week. For 
lower income earners this rebate is less, in dollar terms. Such a 
tax credit is unconditional but not universal. This two-rate tax 
scale (0% and 30%) is equivalent to a single-rate scale (flat tax) 
combined with an annual unconditional benefit of upto $3,900. 
Through this accounting procedure, the graduated income 
tax scales which have evolved in a historical path-dependent 
manner can be represented as a flat (proportional) tax  accom-
panied by a capped benefit (tax credit) that, for low earners, 
increases with income. In this way, the income tax conforms 
to the principle of horizontal equity—all income is taxed at 
the same rate—though the resulting implicit benefit (Rankin, 
2012) fails to conform to either horizontal or vertical equity 
principles. 
The point of this accounting reform is to apply a single 
rate of income tax—a rate appropriate to the resource base 
and productivity of the country—and to account for any re-
vealed credits as unconditional benefits. Hidden inequities are 
revealed. And traditional income tax cuts—reducing lower 
income bracket rates or raising bracket thresholds—can be 
seen for what they are, increased benefits going disproportion-
ately to those on higher incomes.
The policy challenge is to grasp this opportunity of the 
imagination to reverse the process of increasing economic in-
equality by, over time, making these public equity benefits the 
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same for every tax resident of a country. Thus the maximum 
equity benefit revealed by the accounting reform becomes an 
aspirational target for a genuine public equity dividend; a true 
demogrant rather than the inequitable credit revealed by the 
reform. Such an equity dividend or universal basic income in-
creases the bargaining power of precariously-placed workers. 
It can diminish the poverty trap, whereby beneficiaries seeking 
part-time or temporary employment face both high effective 
marginal tax rates and high bureaucratic compliance. A public 
equity dividend enables all to gain from future increases in 
productivity through increasing equity dividends. Further, 
when productivity gains can be attributed to public inputs, it 
becomes appropriate to raise the tax rate itself, enlarging the 
"public equity fund" (gross public revenue) from which equity 
dividends would be paid.
There is nothing in this discussion which conflicts with 
the "laws of economics" (universally applicable insights rather 
than strict laws), though there may be conflict with economic 
lore. The challenge relates to the normative rather than the 
positive aspects of neoclassical economics. The notion that 
the public is not an equity partner of market production is an 
unaddressed assumption of economists, rather than a tenet of 
economics.
Applying these accounting principles to the United States 
suggests an initial "equity benefit flat tax" couplet of $US 315 
per week ($16,394 per year), with an income tax rate of 33 
percent. For Australia the couplet is $A 232 per week with an 
income tax rate of 37 percent. For New Zealand the couplet 
is $NZ 175 with an income tax rate of 33 percent. Thus it is in 
New Zealand that a universal basic income demogrant is most 
readily achievable. New Zealand already has an unconditional 
(albeit implicit) weekly equity benefit of up to $175. Further, 
New Zealand has a history of social welfare infused with uni-
versal principles.
 
New Zealand as a Model for Change 
New Zealand is well placed to lead the way in fiscal 
reforms of a universal or "equitarian" (Rankin, 2014, p. 3) 
nature because it has a near 80-year history of retirement 
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demogrants (universal "superannuation" benefits) and a longer 
history of progressive change in, for example, electoral reform 
(Rankin, 2016d), non-contributory pensions (McClure, 1998), 
labour arbitration and land reform (Coleman, 1987). Further, 
New Zealand in 2016 has a simple "flattish" four-step income 
tax scale (The Treasury, 2016) that can easily be re-accounted 
for in terms that make adaption to a "basic income flat tax" 
fiscal platform a technically straightforward matter.
From the 1890s, New Zealand gained a reputation as a 
model or pilot for progressive social reforms that might be 
adopted more generally in the then emerging countries that 
aspired to economic and social progress. At the time, Australia 
was not a single country; rather it was six separate self-gov-
erning British colonies, each with the same status as New 
Zealand. While the reform process was most advanced in New 
Zealand, in part because much of Australia was mired in fi-
nancial crisis and economic depression throughout the 1890s, 
the Australasian region as a whole came to be characterized by 
a comprehensive set of "State Experiments" (Reeves, 1902), cre-
ating the "social laboratory" metaphor.  The American progres-
sive movement, in its early years from around 1900, took much 
inspiration from New Zealand's reforms (Coleman, 1987). 
The United States, and especially California, was well 
placed to evaluate New Zealand in its own right, and not as 
an Australian appendage. New Zealand links with California 
started in the New Zealand gold rush era (1860s), and grew 
from there with the introduction of regular steamship ser-
vices in the 1870s, the trans-Pacific telegraph cable, and the 
trans-continental railway facilitating passenger travel from 
New Zealand to the United States and to the United Kingdom 
(Muldoon, 1985). New Zealand as a progressive society was an 
easy role model for American reformers, a number of whom 
visited and wrote widely of their experiences, or at least their 
impressions, filtered by the expectations that motivated their 
journeys. 
The reputation of New Zealand as a reforming pioneer in 
the 1890s was an inspiration that the first Labour Government 
—elected in 1935 at the end of the Great Depression—sought 
to re-establish. The late 1930s was a favorable conjuncture 
with New Zealand's recovery already underway, and with 
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widespread public appetite for reform. Of particular abhor-
rence were the bureaucratic processes people had had to 
go through in order to attain and maintain access to public 
"Charitable Aid" (Belgrave, 2004, p. 27). The credibility of this 
government of self-educated radicals depended on it meeting 
expectations raised on the hustings in and before 1935. 
New Zealand's laboratory reputation was rekindled in the 
1980s (Labrum, 2009), when the 1984-90 Labour Government 
repudiated many of its predecessors' reforms by embarking on 
a rapid and comprehensive "neoliberal" program of financial 
deregulation and managerial reform. New Zealand's versions 
of "Reaganomics" and "Thatcherism" were popularly known 
as "Rogernomics" and "Ruthenasia" (New Zealand Council of 
Trade Unions [NZCTU], 2014), in reference to the respective 
Ministers of Finance. One such reform referred to in econom-
ics textbooks (e.g., Mishkin, 2013, p. 440) was the New Zealand 
1989 Reserve Bank Act, the first instance of formal inflation-
targeting as the basis for monetary policy. Of particular inter-
est here, however, is the substantial flattening of the income 
tax scale that took its final form in 1988 with just two statutory 
rates of income tax, 24 and 33 percent.  
In 2015, The Economist published the following: "Kiwis as 
Guinea Pigs" and "In Praise of Human Guinea Pigs." The first 
article refers to a new version of the social laboratory phenom-
enon, the propensity of companies like Microsoft to pilot new 
software and hardware products in the small and contained 
New Zealand market. The second article is an argument for 
governments to adopt policies that can be demonstrated to 
have achieved their stated goals. The goals of the "universal 
welfare state"—a label sometimes applied to post-1940 New 
Zealand—were to achieve income equity in the context of 
full-employment economic growth. Low inequality and full-
employment were indeed realized in the decades between 
1940 and 1980. Some of these achievements remain embed-
ded in New Zealand lore (and law), despite political reversals 
(Belgrave, 2004). For example, New Zealand twice revived its 
"universal superannuation"—albeit under different names—in 
1976 and in 1998.  Public hospitals remain free, despite efforts 
in the 1990s to invoice patients who did not hold a "commu-
nity services card" (Kelsey, 1997, p. 177).
One significant recent political reform took place in New 
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Zealand over the period from 1992 to 1996 (Mein Smith, 
2012; Rankin, 2016d). Through popular referendum, the es-
sentially two-party parliament, formerly elected in the style 
of British and Canadian parliaments, was replaced with a 
mixed-member proportional (MMP) parliament, elected more 
in the style of the German Bundestag. This created a genuine 
multi-party proportional system, with each voter's vote con-
tributing equitably to the election result, not just voters in mar-
ginal electoral districts determining the outcome.
The present challenge—while acknowledging an eclectic 
range of past reforms—is to return to universal equity-based 
approaches to public welfare in the spirit of the 1938-1984 era, 
redressing the undeniable distributional problems that char-
acterize twenty-first century capitalism in New Zealand and 
elsewhere.
 
Unconditional Income in New Zealand's History 
Public superannuation since 1940, universal family ben-
efits (popularly known as a mother's wage) (McClure, 1998, 
p. 109), personal tax rebates, and flattened income tax scales 
all represent historical steps in New Zealand that lead in the 
direction of a universal basic income. But it is a circuitous path 
that has no necessary destination. The failure to index family 
benefits to inflation reduced the relevance of, and hence the 
public commitment to, them. Non-refundable tax credits—
called "'personal tax rebates"—came without fanfare in 1974 
(Rankin, 2006). They were abolished in 1978, a victim of infla-
tion and a push for reduced marginal tax rates for workers 
on modest wages. Nevertheless history, New Zealand's small 
size, and the relative simplicity and flatness of the income tax 
scale gave New Zealand reform opportunities less available 
elsewhere. 
Universal Superannuation 
Included in the Labour Government's ambitious 1938 
Social Security legislation was a modest demogrant for all 
residents over 65 years of age. This universal basic income for 
seniors captured the public imagination, despite its low initial 
level of £10 per year. Welfare was seen to be moving from 
charity towards income sharing. Universal superannuation 
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represented a significant break from the selective "working 
class welfare" that commenced in New Zealand and Australia 
in the 1890s (Castles, 1985, p. 8). It emerged as a rights-based 
complement to (and not a substitute for) the means-tested age 
benefit. Universal superannuation acknowledged the rights 
of men and women who had contributed to New Zealand's 
productiveness in all possible ways, including but not only 
through paid contributions in careers and in business. 
Labour had attained power in 1935 with a substantial 
level of non-working-class support. An important reason for 
Labour's then electoral success was its rhetoric against the in-
dignity in the Depression of having to navigate highly bureau-
cratic channels for conditional assistance, having to declare all 
bits and pieces of household income that might subsequently 
be gained, and having assistance reduced in proportion to 
these casual earnings. In 1937, however, Labour in govern-
ment was prepared to abandon its 1935 commitment (Hanson, 
1980), worried that, for a given revenue base, the country could 
not afford universal benefits at a high enough level. In the end 
it was two public servants (Hanson, 1980, p. 92), recognizing 
that the public believed the principle of universality to be more 
important than the level of payments, who showed the gov-
ernment how public expectations could be met. Change for 
the better often arises from small beginnings. Labour was re-
elected in 1938 with the largest popular vote granted to any 
political party in the twentieth century. 
The 1938 Social Security reforms were financed in large 
part by a flat rate "social security" income tax, set initially at 5 
percent, but for most of its life at 7.5 percent. After various ad-
justments for inflation and growth, in 1967 universal superan-
nuation was widely understood as a weekly retirement benefit 
of $NZ 10.75 ($US $15 at the fixed exchange rate of the time) 
funded by a flat income tax of 7.5 percent. While the universal 
superannuation and the social security tax became, de facto, a 
"universal benefit flat tax" couplet, the distinction between a 
contributory (pre-funded) and non-contributory pension was 
never clear in the public mind. While the social security tax 
was thought of by many as a contributory fund, the superan-
nuation benefits were in fact funded on a "pay as you go" basis 
out of current government revenue.
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Universal Family Benefits 
In 1938, the Family Allowance was renamed Family Benefit. 
It was a means-tested payment, dating from 1927, to mothers 
of third and subsequent children of low-income families. The 
1938 legislation made this benefit available to all children of 
low income families. Legislation in 1945 reinvented the Family 
Benefit as a universal (and quite generous) mothers' payment 
with respect to New Zealand children aged under 16. It came 
to be seen as a mothers' wage—an acknowledgement of the im-
portance of parenting across the socio-economic spectrum—in 
much the same sense that universal superannuation was an 
acknowledgement in retirement of the working-age contribu-
tions of all older citizens, and not just paid workers. It reflected 
a growing political consensus in support of inclusive rights-
based welfare. Once again, a universal benefit would capture 
the public imagination, this time in recognition of both the eco-
nomic contributions of women and their citizenship rights. 
The Family Benefit became a victim of "Ruthenasia," 
through its erosion in the face of inflation, and on account of 
the 1980s' return to a "low-tax, targeted-benefits" philosophy. 
Rather than raising or indexing the Family Benefit to inflation, 
the Labour Government in 1984 introduced a parallel (and 
highly conditional) "Family Care" benefit. Universal family 
benefits were abolished entirely in 1991, by two mothers, 
Finance Minister Ruth Richardson and Social Welfare Minister 
Jenny Shipley (who later became New Zealand's first woman 
Prime Minister). In 2006 (St. John & Rankin, 2009, p. 10) 
another form of mothers' wage was introduced—called the "In 
Work Tax Credit" (IWTC)—$60 per week to most mothers in 
single earner families, plus mothers in low-income two-earner 
families. While New Zealand retains its tradition dating back 
to 1946 of paying benefits to mothers, IWTCs are used today 
to help maintain a significant disposable income gap between 
families who gain their income from the labour market and 
those who do not.  
Early 1970s: Extensions and Departures 
The Royal Commission on Social Security (Royal 
Commission, 1972) generally acceded to the rights-based ap-
proach to social security, now thought of as "social welfare" 
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(McClure, 1998, p. 145) on account of a merger with the Child 
Welfare agency. All citizens should have an opportunity to 
participate in community life, the Commission asserted; there 
would be no second-class citizens. The Royal Commission 
proposed some extensions (especially a greater acknowledge-
ment of single-parent families), and it made more explicit the 
aims of the 1938 legislation, which was to create an inclusive 
society around the principle of sharing, rather than that of 
begrudging redistribution (McClure, 1998, p. 166). The Royal 
Commission favored a dual system of retirement benefits: one 
age benefit means-tested and available from age 60; the other 
being a taxable superannuation benefit available at age 65 to 
all people meeting residency criteria. 
Despite these findings, the most overt welfare initiatives 
of the 1972-75 Labour Government were to introduce two new 
benefits based on explicit insurance principles. Social insur-
ance had been much discussed in the sixty years before World 
War II, but never became a part of actual welfare programs 
in New Zealand (McClure, 2003). The first was a "no-fault" 
Accident Compensation scheme (ACC), designed to provide 
prompt compensation payments and to avoid litigation. ACC's 
main benefits would be earnings-related; the scheme heavily 
favored working men. The second was a superannuation fund 
based on individual contributions and actuarially determined 
benefits; again this was a working men's scheme. This "New 
Zealand Superannuation," which would generate new tax-
like revenue and place it into a sovereign wealth fund, would 
displace both universal superannuation and means-tested age 
benefits. 
This government did something else—barely noticed— in-
troducing in 1974 a proto-demogrant that could have been the 
forerunner of a public equity dividend. Instead it became the 
catalyst for a substantially fattened income tax scale (Rankin, 
2006). Traditionally, almost all income tax scales had formal 
exemptions (or "allowances"). In the 1973 Budget, this allow-
ance was abolished and replaced by a "personal tax rebate" of 
$NZ 125 that today would be called a tax credit. The first $1 
of market earnings would now be subject to an 18% tax rate. 
This annual credit was "non-refundable," meaning that part of 
it was forfeited if a person paid less tax than the full rebate. 
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Although the credit diminished to zero at zero annual income, 
workers earning at least $NZ 670 (about $US 1,000 in 1974) 
per year (and dependent spouses) would gain the $125 credit 
in full. Six hundred and seventy dollars was a low threshold 
annual income. 
The result of netting the personal tax rebate against the 
higher level of taxation was a net tax cut, with the largest gains 
to low-earning full-time workers, and the smallest gains to 
middle income earners. The personal tax rebate became a prec-
edent to later benefits that would be paid by Inland Revenue 
(the taxation authority) rather than through the Department 
of Social Welfare. It was paid as a right—as a technical adjust-
ment to net earnings—and not on any assessment of need. It 
was funded by a flattening and raising of the income tax scale. 
While the rebate was accounted for as a tax offset rather than 
as a cash benefit, it need not have been so. Thus, the signifi-
cance of the personal tax rebate was disguised by the account-
ing procedures used. The modern word—"credit" rather than 
"rebate"—would lend itself more to this benefit being under-
stood as publicly-sourced income. Nevertheless the account-
ing of tax credits, discounts and subsidies remains ambiguous 
and inconsistent. 
The 1974 personal tax rebate was abolished in 1978. It had 
not been inflation-indexed and had become an easy target for 
a Finance Minister with other priorities. New Zealand was left 
with an income tax rate that was unusually high at very low 
income levels. First dollars earned were subject to 14.5 percent 
income taxation (Rankin, 2006, p. 16), a very small concession 
to the loss of the personal tax credit. Ten years later, the income 
tax scale would be further flattened, with the top rate coming 
down in two years from 66 to 48 to 33 percent.
National Superannuation 
Labour's contributory New Zealand Superannuation 
scheme did not capture the public's imagination. In 1974, Robert 
Muldoon, the new National Party leader (former Finance 
Minister, 1967-72) saw a return to universal superannuation 
as a clear pathway to electoral success in 1975. The scheme 
he devised represented the full embodiment of Labour's 1935 
vision: a generous but taxable retirement demogrant (payable 
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at age 60) to fully displace means-tested age benefit. 
National Superannuation, as it was called, was 
implemented in 1976, when Muldoon became Prime Minister 
and Finance Minister. He fully appreciated that this was a 
taxable benefit and therefore was subject to substantial claw-
back. Others did not appreciate this nuance, and overstated its 
cost. In the late-1970s, the top income tax rate was 60 percent. 
With high inflation in in the early-1980s, many taxpayers found 
themselves paying 60 percent as their marginal tax rate. Such 
persons old enough to receive National Superannuation re-
tained just 40 percent of their gross pension. In 2016, National 
Superannuation survives as a taxable but otherwise universal 
publicly-sourced senior-citizen income. The effective univer-
sal component is now higher (although the age of eligibility 
is now 65), because the top income-tax rate in New Zealand is 
33 percent, as it has been for most years since 1988. This after-
tax core benefit is a basic income dividend for seniors that has 
existed in New Zealand at one level or other since 1940.
New Zealand Superannuation (as it is now called) remains 
susceptible to conditionality. Important reasons cited for its 
alleged unaffordability are the low marginal rate of tax paid by 
high earning recipients, and the increasing numbers of eligible 
beneficiaries—the retiring post war "baby boom" generation. 
Utilities and Iwi  
In the period from 1987 to 1993, New Zealand public 
assets were substantially corporatized and in many cases 
privatized.  Two of the largest "cities" that made up greater 
Auckland—New Zealand's largest metropolitan area—the 
Auckland Electric Power Board did not sell to private buyers 
(and distribute the proceeds to its customers) as many other 
local power companies had done. Instead it became Mercury 
Energy, the property of a newly formed community trust—
Auckland Electricity Consumer Trust (AECT, 2016)—that in 
turn was owned by the electricity account holders in those two 
cities. In 1999, Mercury's retail arm was sold to a central gov-
ernment-owned generation business (Mighty River Power) 
and its transmission arm was renamed Vector. AECT benefi-
ciaries receive annual dividends from the trust. The "Vector 
dividend" is a property-rights-based universal income, payable 
unconditionally to AECT trustees, about half of Auckland's 
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electricity account holders. Though on a smaller scale, the AECT 
operates much like the Alaska Permanent Fund, which distrib-
utes Alaska's oil and mineral royalties as an equity dividend to 
the people of Alaska.
From the 1990s, a number of Iwi (indigenous Maori tribes) 
have received substantial cash settlements arising from past 
breaches of New Zealand's foundation Treaty (of Waitangi), 
signed in 1840. These Iwi—for example Tainui and Ngai Tahu 
—operate their settlements as incorporated trusts, which are 
for the most part highly profitable. To be a beneficiary of one 
of these trusts, you need to prove descent from a person who 
belonged to that Iwi in 1840. No Iwi presently pay uncondi-
tional benefits to their membership, but they easily could. The 
structures are in place for Iwi dividends to be paid much as 
any publicly-listed company may pay dividends to its share-
holders, or indeed much as the Alaska Permanent Fund pays 
dividends. Watch this space. 
 
Income Tax Policy since 1987 
Income Tax Reform
In December 1987, Finance Minister Roger Douglas an-
nounced that New Zealand would have a single "flat" rate of 
income tax of 24 percent (James, 1992, p. 238). This would be 
accompanied by a Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI). To 
some, this GMI sounded like a basic income (e.g., Easton, 2016). 
It was not. The GMI was an employee wage top-up. Recipients 
of this top-up would face an effective marginal tax rate of 100 
percent. Wage-earners earning above the income threshold 
would not receive any publicly-sourced income. In this neo-
liberal view, a country's national income was conceived as 100 
percent private, with the state then using its power of appro-
priation to take a share for itself. From an alternative "public 
equity" standpoint, a substantial share of national income is 
intrinsically public, and (like company profits) is available for 
equitable distribution.
Early in 1988, Labour Prime Minister David Lange can-
celled his Finance Minister's tax plan (Gustafson, 2013). It led 
to Douglas' resignation (as Minister of Finance) later that year. 
Nevertheless, the resulting compromise remained radical. The 
one-rate tax scale proposed was replaced by a statutory two 
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rate scale (24 and 33 percent) with a low-income rebate that 
made it effectively a three-rate scale for wage earners. The 
main outcome was that the income tax scale became very flat 
in comparison with those of most other countries. The top rate 
of income tax came down from 66 percent to 33 percent in just 
two years. 
While the philosophies that prevailed within both main 
political parties from 1984 were inimical to universal welfare, 
a flat tax rate of 33 percent could have funded a meaningful 
equity dividend. Labour's two-rate tax scale was closer to the 
type of income tax that could accompany a public equity divi-
dend than any other historical example of which I am aware. 
In 2016, New Zealand continues to have an income tax scale 
much like that introduced in 1988. While it is now a four-rate 
scale, the top rate is still 33 percent, and it becomes effective 
at the comparatively low annual income of $NZ 70,000 (about 
$US 50,000). If one accounts for the present scale as if it was a 
33 percent flat tax, the concession that represents the impact of 
the lower rates sums to an annual benefit of $9,080. Thus, by 
adopting this accounting approach, we can say that all New 
Zealand residents earning $NZ 70,000 or more presently pay 
tax at 33 percent and receive an unconditional benefit of $9,080 
($NZ 175 per week; $US 125). A person earning $50,000 before 
tax, about the median fulltime income, is likewise receiving an 
implicit annual benefit of $8,480 just from adding the tax dis-
counts that arise from the statutory graduation process.  
In New Zealand it is therefore possible to establish a UBI, 
the most radical part being the accounting reconceptualiza-
tion. Under simplified accounting procedures, all income 
would be taxed at 33 percent and all adult tax residents would 
be attributed an offsetting public equity benefit each week. 
Incorporating present transfer payments and superannuation 
benefits into the schema—including Family Tax Credits—
most New Zealand adults already have at least $175 per week 
of publicly-sourced income. (Indeed resident students and 
young job-seekers presently qualify for a weekly benefit of 
$175.) For most employed people, the only immediate impact 
of such an accounting reform would be a change in the item-
ization on their pay-slips.
An attractive political option for one major political 
party in New Zealand would be, in lieu of a conventional 
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pre-election tax-cut, to go into the next election (scheduled for 
2017) with a policy to introduce a minimum publicly-sourced 
income of $175 per week, alongside a single-rate income tax of 
33 percent, with nobody facing a reduced disposable income. 
If that Party was the more conservative National Party, then 
Labour, with its more progressive and egalitarian self image, 
could respond with, say, a 35 percent tax rate proposal and 
a commensurately higher minimum publicly-sourced income, 
such as $200 per week.
 
New Zealand Party Politics in the 2010s 
For the 2014 parliamentary elections, two out of eight rep-
resented parties tentatively included a Universal Basic Income 
in their policy manifestos: the Green Party (third largest party) 
and the small left-wing Mana Party, which is no longer repre-
sented, though for reasons unrelated to its advocacy of UBI. 
This means that Universal Basic Income has been widely per-
ceived as a policy of the radical left. This perception is chang-
ing, however, with UBI (or UBI-like) proposals having become 
part of the mainstream discussion in European political dis-
course. New Zealand's Labour Party leader Andrew Little— 
who assumed that position in 2014—specifically mentioned 
"universal basic income" in the context of his "Future of Work" 
policy initiative (Green, 2015; Radio New Zealand National, 
2014).  
Despite the universalist rhetoric of its now-legendary 1938 
Social Security reforms, the Labour Party's political instincts, 
then and now, have been to emphasize selective entitlements 
(conditional and income-tapered) over universal benefits. 
Labour's present instinct is to fund slightly more generous ben-
efits by increasing the top rate of income tax. In 2000 the newly 
elected Labour-led government created a new 39 percent top 
tax rate, and subsequently increased payments of Family Tax 
Credits. The top rate of income tax reverted to 33 percent in 
2011, under a National-led government. 
It is difficult to see Labour committing itself to a single-
rate income tax because of the long-term political fallout 
arising from Roger Douglas' proposal in 1987, when Douglas 
used "flat-tax" as code for "low-tax." Subsequently, in the 
1990s, Douglas founded the neoliberal ACT Party, which rep-
resents the right-wing of New Zealand politics, and which 
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consistently advocates low flat taxes. Any language associated 
with Douglas is anathema to the present-day Labour Party. 
Further, the talk so far—as in an interview with Labour's 
present finance spokesperson Grant Robertson on the weekend 
of Labour's 2015 party conference (The Nation, 2015)—is of an 
easily accessed benefit that will tide workers over between 
periods of employment, rather than of an integration of taxes 
and benefits (Rankin, 2016b) conforming to equity principles. 
Robertson, attending the OECD Future of Work Forum in 
Paris, appears unenthusiastic (Smellie, 2016), taking a workers' 
rather than a citizens' perspective. Labour's most recent floating 
of the idea of a universal basic income—through a background 
paper to its Future of Work project (Harris & Bierema, 2016)—
has gained attention from the mainstream media. Eventually 
the conservative Prime Minister responded, saying "a 'univer-
sal basic income' is a 'barking mad' idea that would cost more 
than the country brings in from tax" (Davison, 2016). Basic 
income literacy remains low in New Zealand; New Zealand's 
welfare history is much celebrated but little understood.
The centre-right National Government may seem an un-
likely bet to respond to Labour's Future of Work proposals 
with an equity dividend flat-tax proposal as I have outlined. 
The principal constraint here is a lack of political imagination 
rather than a surfeit of anti-universal ideology. However, the 
reality of coalition government—the norm in New Zealand 
since 1996—requires some intellectual accommodation on the 
part of conservative parties. Indeed, the National Party does 
have a history of embracing reforms instigated by other parties 
in government. The political partnership of the National Party 
and the more instinctively radical (yet business friendly) 
Maori Party could draw National into some reflection on this 
matter. Another possibility would be that National in 2017 
might require the support of the Green Party or the moder-
ately nationalist New Zealand First Party to form a govern-
ment. It was the latter in 1998 which forced the restoration of 
New Zealand Superannuation as a genuine demogrant, a "uni-
versal pension with no form of targeting" (Preston, 2001, para 
2). An adaptive UBI proposal in the nature of that outlined 
here (e.g., 33 percent tax, $175 per week credit) could become 
the lesser price National would be prepared to pay to stay in 
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government. 
 
Overcoming Inertia 
An important lesson from 1938 is that New Zealanders 
tend to be most comfortable with modest benefits that are the 
same for all, with uncomplicated supplementary assistance 
for those who need more. Nevertheless "nineteenth century 
ideas about deserving and undeserving, while modified in the 
present, still provide restraints on present debates about New 
Zealand's welfare state, and limit governments in the trouble-
some task of welfare reform" (Belgrave, 2012, p. 4). 
Another important lesson from 1938 is that progress is an 
adaptive process that unfolds over time, and not a "big bang" 
one-off policy reset. In the case of universal superannuation, 
a timetable was specified: an annual increment in the benefit, 
until a threshold was reached. In today's context, the timeta-
ble would be a commitment to prioritize the increasing of im-
plicit benefits ("tax discounts") available to the low waged and 
the precariously employed, ahead of traditional tax cuts that 
give increased benefits to people on high incomes. Further, 
good benefit policy should include an indexing provision; for 
example, a formula to subsequently raise benefit amounts each 
year by at least the annual percentage increase of wages. An 
equity benefit—capital income, not a wage—could be indexed 
to gross national income per capita. 
Philosophically-driven change struggles against political 
inertia and media cynicism. So does imagination. Universal 
Basic Income only seems radical to those who lack the capac-
ity to appreciate what it is and what it isn't. Lacking imagina-
tion is not confined to the world of ideas. The notion today 
that a National Party Prime Minister might invite the Green 
Party to participate in government does not sit well with main-
stream pundits who have framed the 2017 election as a set-
piece contest between National and Labour-Green, with the 
New Zealand First Party becoming a likely "king-maker." It 
may be time that the Green Party accepted the role of power 
broker, and an adaptive Universal Basic Income could be the 
issue through which such a governing relationship is forged.
Likewise, novelty on fiscal (or monetary) matters tends to 
be seen as electorally risky, at least while the New Zealand 
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economy continues to grow when macroeconomic weakness 
prevails in many other countries. Comparative economic 
strength tends to exacerbate election-year inertia within gov-
erning coalitions. Nevertheless, New Zealand appears to have 
(on average) a nine-year political cycle; and timing which has 
coincided with global economic downturns. Changes of gov-
ernment took place in 1975, 1984, 1990, 1999 (after the Asian 
crisis which brought recession to New Zealand), and 2008. In 
each case, change was due to a mix of economic and non-eco-
nomic factors; New Zealanders tend to tire of tired govern-
ments. The electoral challenge, then, in 2017 is for both Labour 
and National and to try to capture the people's imagination 
with some fresh ideas, while not allowing any socio-economic 
group to portray themselves as losers from policies that might 
arise from those ideas. While inequality is understood as the 
big issue of this decade, few voters will accept being at the 
paying end of a program that looks like income redistribution.
Universal Basic Income is too widely understood as rep-
resenting a maximum as well as a minimum level of publicly-
sourced income payable to citizens. So long as this perception 
remains, the chances of a basic income dividend for all adults 
being introduced in New Zealand are close to zero. To be an 
adequate maximum, the standard criticisms of unaffordabil-
ity, "better things to do with the money," and "license to loaf" 
will apply. Rather, the public equity approach outlined—with 
a basic income to all that represents a minimum but not a 
maximum—stands to resonate, much as the idea of universal 
superannuation did in the 1930s.
An adaptive Universal Basic Income that represents more 
a change of imagination than an immediate redistribution of 
income stands to become popular so long as common miscon-
ceptions are promptly and plausibly refuted in the mainstream 
media. What a Universal Basic Income can do is firstly arrest 
the growth of income inequality, and secondly, create an op-
portunity for productivity gains to reverse the "winners take 
all" tendency of modern e-capitalism, creating less inequality 
alongside more productivity. 
People with substantial market-sourced incomes will 
always be much wealthier than people reliant on publicly-
sourced income. A Universal Basic Income helps to maintain a 
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healthy balance between these two income sources; one inher-
ently unequal while the other—public equity—should be equal 
by definition. Because underlying public equity has increased 
with productivity gains, so should the total pool of public 
income have increased. New Zealand has both its history of 
universal welfare and the simplicity of its tax code to show 
how the application of public equity concepts to productivity 
growth might address capitalism's immediate distributional 
challenges. Liberal democracies work best when public prop-
erty rights are recognized alongside private rights.
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